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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2A-3(f) (1953). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue for review is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion by not granting the defendant's several motions 
for a mistrial. The issue was preserved for review in several 
different parts of the transcript. (Tr. at 80 - 90), (Tr. at 
133-141), (Tr. at 149 - 153), (Tr. at 196 - 201). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard 
pursuant to State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (See Appendix 1). 
Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (See Appendix 2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves the alleged sale of approximately one-
eighth of an ounce of marijuana by defendants to a confidential 
informant. 
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B. Proceedings Below. 
The information in this matter was filed on July 21, 1993. 
(R. at 7). Preliminary hearing was held on August 6, 1993. 
Defendant was bound over to district court. (R. at 30). Jury 
trial was held on May 4, 1994. (R. at 185). Defendant was 
convicted. Judgment, sentence, order suspending execution of 
sentence, and the order of probation were entered on July 22, 
1994. (R. at 214). Notice of appeal was filed on August 1, 
1994. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, a confidential informant Melva Palmasano testified 
that on July 13, 1993, she purchased 1/8 of an ounce of marijuana 
from the defendant. (Tr. at 205, 208-210). In his opening 
statement, the prosecutor referred to a criminal act purportedly 
committed by the defendant but still pending in another case. 
(Tr. at 80). Trial defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the 
basis that the statement prejudiced the defendant. (Tr. at 80). 
The trial judge admonished the prosecutor to limit his remarks, 
but denied the motion for a mistrial. (Tr. at 90-91). 
Later in the trial, the prosecutor elicited hearsay 
testimony of a police officer that the defendant was selling 
marijuana to minors, which was not alleged in the current charge, 
nor had it been charged separately. (Tr. at 135). The defense 
again moved for a mistrial. (Tr. at 135). The court admonished 
the prosecutor to stay away from such areas as it was immaterial 
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and also bordering on prejudicial. (Tr. at 139-140). The court 
struck the testimony from the record and ordered the jury to 
disregard the statement. (Tr. at 140). The second motion for a 
mistrial was denied. (Tr. at 139). 
The prosecutor then elicited testimony from the officer 
wherein the officer testified that a transcript of a tape of the 
alleged transaction between the informant and the defendant 
existed. (Tr. at 149). The defense moved for a mistrial on the 
basis that the prosecutor had indicated that he would not use 
tapes or transcripts. (Tr. at 149-152). Neither tapes nor 
transcripts had been given to the defense prior to trial, and the 
prosecution and defense counsel had agreed that tapes would not 
be used. (Tr. at 149-152). The court stated that reference to 
transcripts under the circumstances was prejudicial and ordered 
the prosecutor not to refer to them again. (Tr. at 153). The 
third motion for a mistrial was denied. (Tr. at 153). 
Finally, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the 
confidential informant to the effect that she, her husband, 
defendant, and defendant's husband had all been charged with 
selling drugs previously, but that defendant and defendant's 
husband were continuing to sell. (Tr. at 196-197). There was 
also an inference that defendant and defendant's husband had 
previously been arrested. (Tr. at 196-197) . This statement, 
besides being prejudicial, was untrue as defendant had never been 
previously arrested. (Tr. at 197). Defendant's fourth motion 
for a mistrial was denied. (Tr. at 201-202). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal is based on four instances of error which 
occurred during the trial. The first error occurred during the 
opening statement of the prosecution. The prosecutor indicated 
that the defendant was planning a trip to California to buy 
drugs. (Tr. at 80). This trip, and the contraband allegedly 
purchased on the trip were the subject of a separate action then 
pending in another division of the Fourth District Court. (Tr. 
at 81). This trip occurred after the alleged sale of marijuana 
which is the subject of this action. (Tr. at 86) . Trial counsel 
moved for a mistrial on the basis of prejudice. (Tr. at 80). 
The second error occurred when the prosecutor elicited 
hearsay testimony from a police officer that the defendant was 
selling marijuana to minors, a crime of which the defendant has 
never been accused. (Tr. at 135). The defense moved for a 
mistrial. (Tr. at 135). The court struck the testimony from the 
record and ordered the jury to disregard the statement. (Tr. at 
140-141) . The motion for a mistrial was denied. (Tr. at 139) . 
The third error occurred when the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from an officer wherein the officer testified that a 
transcript of a tape between the informant and the defendant 
existed. (Tr. at 149). The defense moved for a mistrial on the 
basis that the prosecutor had indicated prior to trial that he 
would not use tapes or transcripts. (Tr. at 149-152). Neither 
tapes nor transcripts had been timely given to the defense. (Tr. 
at 149-152) . 
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The final error occurred when the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from the confidential informant that defendant and her 
husband had been arrested for selling drugs previously, and that 
they were continuing to sell. (Tr. at 196-197). Defendant's 
motion for a mistrial was denied. (Tr. at 201) . 
Each of the instances of error standing alone constitutes 
sufficient grounds for reversal and remand. Each of the 
instances gave the jury information which was prejudicial to 
defendant, and which tended to persuade the jury to convict the 
defendant for bad character rather than basing the conviction on 
the evidence. 
The errors are particularly harmful in this case where usual 
procedures were not followed in setting up this alleged drug 
transaction. The confidential informant and her husband were not 
searched. The premises were not searched. (Tr. at 167). Money 
was not given by the police to the confidential informants with 
which to purchase the contraband. (Tr. at 220). The 
confidential informant was facing charges at the time. (Tr. at 
215). The confidential informant admitted having lied to the 
same police officers on another occasion. (Tr. at 223, 244). 
The confidential informant was eventually paid for her testimony. 
(Tr. at 220-221). 
The defense strategy at trial was to damage the credibility 
of the confidential informant and make the jury believe that she 
may have fabricated the story. The Confidential informant's 
credibility was damaged, and without the additional damage which 
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came from the improper evidence and statement, defendant may not 
have been convicted. Because of the exposure of the jury to 
prejudicial comments and evidence, confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. This action should therefore be reversed and 
remanded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
There are three similar standards of review in the case at 
bar even though the only issue on appeal involves a failure to 
grant mistrials. In two of the three situations the standard is 
abuse of discretion. The other standard is bifurcated standard. 
Part of the determination is reviewed for correctness and the 
balance on a clearly erroneous standard. The slight differences 
in application of these standards are based on the differences in 
the specific claimed errors. 
The first motion for a mistrial in the case at bar was for 
a situation involving a prejudicial statement made by the 
prosecutor during his opening remarks. The standard of review is 
an abuse of discretion standard. In State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 
186, 190 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must 
determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls to the attention 
of the jurors matters they would not be justified in 
considering in reaching the verdict and, if so whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced 
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result 
absent the misconduct. State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6 (Dec. 22 1987); State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 36 (Utah 
1984). In determining whether a remark or question by the 
prosecution had such an effect, the alleged misconduct must 
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be viewed in light of the totality of the trial. No one is 
in a more advantageous position to view the incident in the 
context of the trial judge; therefore, his rulings on 
whether the conduct of the prosecution warranted a mistrial 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 517 P.2d 1322 1324 (Utah 
1974). 
The second standard of review is one which is bifurcated 
and is based on admission of evidence under rules 403 and 404 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Admission of evidence under Rule 404 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is a question of law which must 
be reviewed for correctness. The subsidiary factual 
determinations are given deference and are reversed only where 
clearly erroneous. 
Because the admission of evidence under Rule 404 (b) is a 
question "of law, it is reviewed for correctness. However, 
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations should 
be given deference by the appellate court and only be 
overruled when they are clearly erroneous." State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (citation 
omitted; see also State v. Thurman No. 910494, slip of. at 
17-19 n. 11 (Utah Jan. 7. 1993) (recognizing bifurcated 
standard when appeals court reviews underlying factual 
findings). When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the 
probativeness of a piece of evidence against its potential 
for unfair prejudice under Rule 403, we reverse only if the 
court's decision as a matter of law "was beyond the limits 
of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992) . Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal 
of a conviction only where we conclude there is a 
"'reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings.'" Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 (quoting 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
State v. O'Niel, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993). 
The final standard of review deals with violations of Rule 
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Complaints that a 
trial court failed to order a requested remedy, or that the 
remedy ordered was insufficient to obviate the harm from the 
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violation are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918, 919 (Utah 1987). 
II. THE PROSECUTION MADE PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS IN OPENING 
ARGUMENT. 
As set forth in the "Statement of Facts" above, defendant in 
this matter is only accused of the sale of a single baggie 
containing approximately 1/8 of an ounce of marijuana. Despite 
this fact, the prosecutor in his opening remarks made the 
following statement: 
MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. Melva Palmasano provided Officer 
Tompkin with information about a trip that Donna Day was 
intending to make to California to pick up controlled 
substances. 
(Tr. at 80). 
At that point, trial counsel made a motion for a mistrial on the 
basis that the statement regarding obtaining controlled 
substances in California was prejudicial and was the subject of 
another case before another judge. The motion for mistrial was 
denied but the prosecution was ordered to "Stay away from the 
California Trip except only as to the conversation." (Tr. at 90, 
91) . The alleged drug transaction which is the subject of this 
action occurred in its entirety prior to the trip to California. 
Because the above statement was made by the prosecutor prior 
to the introduction of any evidence, it must be analyzed in the 
context of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, 
did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in 
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determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks. 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426. See also 
State v. Johnson, Utah, 663 P.2d 48 (1983); State v. 
Gaxiola, Utah, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976). Thus it is a two-step 
test that must be applied "under the circumstances of the 
particular case. . . . " 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
The statement by the prosecutor was prejudicial to the 
defendant. In the case at bar, defendant was charged with 
selling a single baggie of marijuana. The statement of the 
prosecutor tended to point out to the jury the notion that the 
defendant was a large distributor of narcotics, and that she was 
traveling out of state to make drug purchases. This statement 
had to have the effect of inflaming the jury and creating 
prejudice against the defendant. 
In oral argument on the motion for a mistrial the prosecutor 
argued that the allegations regarding the trip to California to 
purchase drugs were an integral part of the transaction in 
question. Essentially, the State was arguing that the 
information regarding the trip to California was necessary for 
foundation. (Tr. at 82, 83). This argument is without merit. 
All of the necessary foundation for the transaction in question 
could have been laid without any reference to the alleged plan to 
purchase drugs. All that was needed was a statement that the 
defendant was planning a trip to California. 
To determine whether improper statements by counsel merit 
reversal, a two part test must be applied. The test is found in 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), as set forth above. 
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Application of the first prong of the test set forth in Troy is 
simple. The first prong is to consider whether the remarks of 
the prosecutor called to the jurors attention information which 
they would not be justified in considering in reaching their 
decision. 
Clearly the jurors would not be justified in considering 
whether the defendant planned or later took a trip to California 
to purchase drugs in determining whether defendant sold marijuana 
to the confidential informant some time prior to the California 
trip. The reference to obtaining illegal drugs in California is 
absolutely unnecessary for foundation. 
The prosecutor could have told the jurors simply that a trip 
was planned, but without stating the purpose of the trip. The 
reference to the trip to California to purchase illegal drugs 
does not go to the elements of the crime charged. Tho only 
purposes for the remarks by the prosecutor were to demonstrate to 
the jury that defendant had a bad character, and to prejudice and 
inflame the jury. 
The improper remarks in the case at bar are in many ways 
similar to the remarks made by the prosecution in Troy. In Troy, 
the prosecutor called to the attention of the jury allegations of 
other crimes, and other bad behavior. In analyzing the facts of 
the Troy case, the court stated: 
Applying step one, we see that the prosecutor was clearly 
calling attention to matters outside the evidence in 
referring to defendant's alias, his being a federal witness, 
and his being involved in 'various criminal matters' and in 
comparing him to 'criminals [who] have all kinds of 
irrational behavior.... Hinckley is a classic example.' In 
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addition, counsel suggested to the jury that it consider and 
deliberate personal experiences Step one of the Valdez test 
was clearly met. 
Troy, at 486. 
Similar to Troy, step one of the Valdez test has been met in the 
case at bar. 
The second prong of the test examines whether the jurors 
were likely to have been influenced by the improper remarks of 
counsel. This test requires this court to analyze the strength 
of the case put on by the prosecution. In the case at bar, the 
state's case was almost entirely built on the testimony of a 
confidential informant, Melva Palmasano. Every one of the 
elements of the crime charged in the information were based on 
the testimony of Ms. Palmasano, an unreliable witness. 
To avoid repetition in this brief, the weaknesses in Ms. 
Palmasano's testimony are discussed in point VI below. If this 
court finds that there is some weakness in the testimony of Melva 
Palmasano, a reversal is warranted. 
III. THE PROSECUTION ELICITED TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN 
ARRESTED FOR SELLING DRUGS PREVIOUSLY AND THAT SHE AND HER 
HUSBAND WERE SELLING ILLEGAL DRUGS. 
The second incident of harmful error will be analyzed out of 
order. Chronologically this was the final error which occurred. 
Because the analysis of this incident is helpful in considering 
the earlier incidents it will be discussed now. 
This error occurred during the testimony of Melva Palmasano. 
It occurred when the Prosecutor improperly asked her about her 
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motivations for having contacted the police. The questionable 
exchange went as follows: 
Q: Why did you take this information to the police? 
A: Why did I take the information? 
Q: Yes. 
A: Because I felt that we had all been arrested for this 
and they were continuing to sell drugs. 
With respect to the defendant, the statement of Melva 
Palmasano is prejudicial in two respects. First, it indicates 
that defendant and her husband were arrested for selling drugs 
previously. Defendant had never been previously arrested on drug 
charges. 
Secondly, the statement indicates that the defendant was 
continuing to sell drugs after an arrest. Defendant had never 
been arrested for or accused of selling drugs previous to the 
case at bar. Both statements were extremely prejudicial to the 
defendant because they tend to inflame the jury, and because they 
are not true. 
Even though they are untrue, the prejudicial statements made 
by Ms. Palmasano fall for purposes of analysis under the 
classification of prior bad act evidence. State v. O'Niel, 848 
P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993), provides an excellent comment on how 
the admission of improper prior bad act evidence before the jury 
must be considered. When considering the admission of such 
evidence, Rules 4 03 and 4 04 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
come into play. In O'Niel, the court stated: 
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Thus, the procedure this court follows when reviewing the 
admission of prior bad act evidence is straight forward. 
First, the evidence must, as a matter of law, be admissible 
under Rule 404 (b). Second we determine, as a matter of 
law, whether the trial court acted reasonably in striking 
the probative value versus the prejudicial effect balance 
required by Rule 403. If both those standards are met we 
will affirm. If we determine either of the first two 
standards is not met, we must then determine whether the 
admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error. 
O'Niel, at 699. 
In analyzing whether the evidence of defendant's alleged 
prior bad acts is admissible Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence must be examined. Rule 404(b) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1992). 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not exclude 
evidence unless it fits into an exception. Relevant evidence is 
allowed, other than to show the disposition of the defendant. 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1987). State v. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983). 
In the case at bar, the evidence offered in the testimony of 
Melva Palmasano fits into one of the exceptions of the rule and 
therefore should have been excluded. This evidence was offered 
to inform the jury regarding Ms. Palmasano's motivations for 
going to the police. What may or may not have motivated her is 
not relevant. 
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To fit within one of the categories of Rule 404(b) that 
allows introduction of prior bad act evidence, the evidence must 
go directly to one of the elements of the crime charged in the 
information. 
Evidence is not admitted merely because it shows a common 
plan, scheme or manner of operation. Instead, evidence of a 
common plan, scheme or manner of operation is admitted where 
it tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged. 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 569 (Utah App. 1991), quoting 
State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah 1982) . 
Because the testimony offered by officer Melva Palmasano was 
not admissible under Rule 404(b), it should not have been 
offered. 
Assuming arguendo that the court holds that the evidence was 
admissible under 4 04(b), the next analysis is to determine 
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court acted appropriately 
in striking the balance between the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of the evidence. This is the analysis which 
must be done under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 
403 states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
There are several factors which must be considered when balancing 
probativeness of evidence against its prejudicial effect. 
Included in these factors are: 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
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need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Schickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988). 
Applying the Schickles analysis it is easy to conclude that 
allowing the jury to hear Melva Palmasano's statements as 
motivation was not within the limits of reasonability. This 
testimony accused defendant in front of the jury of having 
previously sold drugs, and of continuing to sell drugs after a 
previous arrest. These are unfounded allegations for which the 
defendant has never been charged. The only purpose of these 
allegations was to inflame the jury, and to get them to consider 
the character of the defendant in making their decision. This 
evidence is not probative of any of the elements of the crime 
charged in the information, and is extremely prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
Because this evidence was more prejudicial than probative, 
the court must determine as a final matter whether the jury's 
hearing of the evidence constitutes harmful error. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the error 
complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant in its absence. 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). In the case 
at bar, the state's case was not strong as it was almost entirely 
based on the testimony of an unreliable confidential informant. 
To avoid repetition, the problems with the testimony of Melva 
Palmasano will be analyzed in point VI below. If the court finds 
that the testimony of Ms. Palmasano is less than compelling and, 
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absent this error, a different result might have occurred, a 
reversal is warranted. 
IV. THE OFFICER TESTIFIED IMPROPERLY REGARDING ALLEGED BAD ACTS 
OF DEFENDANT. 
Another motion for a mistrial based on testimony involving 
prior bad acts occurred during the testimony of officer Tompkins. 
The exchange went as follows: 
Q: BY MR. ANDERSON: What reason did she give you 
officer why she was giving you this information? 
A: She said that she had been trying to stay off from 
drugs for I believe she said two or three weeks, 
Donnna was a friend of hers and knew this. That Donna 
was still using drugs and trying to get her to use 
drugs and that upset her. She also stated that she was 
selling drugs to kids that were her kids age. She 
didn't think that was right. Basically those were the 
two main issues with Mrs. Palmasano. 
(Tr. at 135). 
The above statement is improper. Melva Palmisano's motivation 
for giving the police information is not relevant. Neither is 
the fact that she was trying to stay off drugs. The statement 
that defendant was using drugs and trying to get her to use drugs 
cannot be supported by the record. The defendant is not charged 
with using drugs, only with distributing them. The allegation 
that the defendant was trying to get Melva Palmasano to use drugs 
is not supported by the facts. The record establishes that Melva 
contacted the defendant and asked about purchasing drugs. (Tr. 
at 195, 207, 208). There is no record of the defendant initially 
contacting her. 
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The statement is also prejudicial because it alleges that 
the defendant was selling drugs to kids. Defendant has never 
been charged with distributing controlled substances to children. 
Prior to this arrest, defendant had never been charged with 
distributing drugs to anyone. The only purpose of this hearsay 
statement was to inflame and prejudice the jury. 
The trial court recognized that the statement of the officer 
was prejudicial but ordered the comments stricken rather than 
granting the motion for a mistrial. By that time, however, the 
jurors had heard the comments and the damage was done. The trial 
court stated: 
I am going to deny your Motion for a Mistrial but I am going 
to caution you Mr. Anderson that I don't think it is 
appropriate to get into some of these areas for the area of 
saying for example that she told me she was going to buy 
these drugs to sell to minors. I think that is immaterial 
and I think it also becomes prejudicial. I think that we 
need to stay away from that kind of a situation, I am 
allowing you to get into it just far enough to indicate that 
there was some conversations, and these are conversations 
that this witness has had with his confidential informant. 
When the confidential informant gets on the stand and then 
that confidential informant she has had conversations with 
the defendant that may be another story. At this point and 
time I don't think these things should be raised beyond the 
fact that I have allowed you to get into the trip to 
California but nothing more than that. I am cautioning you 
don't explore that any further. 
(Tr. at 139, 140). 
In many ways the case at bar is similar to State v. Kazda, 
382 P.2d 407 (Utah 1963). In Kazda an F.B.I, officer testified 
regarding crimes which the defendant was alleged to have 
committed in other states. In response to an objection the trial 
court admonished the jury to disregard the other offenses. 
17 
Despite that instruction, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction finding that admission of the statements of the 
officer constituted prejudicial error. The court stated: 
We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error. It 
implied that the defendant was implicated in other crimes, 
none of them proven, and could have no other effect than to 
degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impression 
that he had a propensity for crime. It is true that the 
defendant admitted prior felony convictions, but 'we cannot 
say with any degree of assurance that there would not have 
been a different result' in the absence of such testimony. 
Kazda, at 409. 
The statements of officer Tompkins constitute evidence of 
prior bad acts, and must be analyzed under Rules 403 and 404(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Because the analysis is exactly 
the same as the point above it will not be repeated here. If the 
court finds in its analysis that this evidence was more 
prejudicial than probative, and that a different result may have 
occurred in its absence, a reversal is warranted. 
V. THE PROSECUTION IMPROPERLY ELICITED TESTIMONY REGARDING A 
TRANSCRIPT OF A TAPE WHICH WAS NOT PROPERLY DISCLOSED TO THE 
DEFENSE. 
The next incident of error in the conduct of the trial in 
the case at bar occurred when officer Tompkins made reference to 
a transcript of a tape which was supposedly made of the alleged 
transaction between the defendant and Melva Palmasano. The 
exchange went as follows: 
Q: Tell the jury the best you can then what was said and 
by whom? 
A: Well, there was I have a transcript of the tape here 
(indicating) there was quite a bit - -
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Mr. Gaither: Objection, I have a motion to make at this 
time your honor. 
(Tr. at 149). 
Prior to trial, Defense counsel sent a request for 
discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The prosecution voluntarily complied with this 
request. (R. at 11). Defense counsel later sent a fax to the 
prosecution, and also had a telephone conversation with the 
prosecution affirming that no tapes were to be used. (Tr. at 
150). Copies of the transcript were not handed out to counsel 
until just prior to the lunch break. (Tr. at 150). 
The nondisclosure of the tapes and transcript occurred 
despite the fact that a Rule 16 motion would have required full 
disclosure of the materials. (Tr. at 150). Regarding 
nondisclosure of materials in a voluntary response to a request 
for discovery the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Under our decision in Knight, when a prosecutor undertakes 
to respond voluntarily to discovery requests from the 
defense, the prosecutor either must produce "all of the 
material requested or must explicitly identify those 
portions of the request with respect to which no responsive 
material will be provided" 734 P.2d at 916-17. This 
obligation is ongoing and is justified as a guard against 
misleading the defense by an incomplete prosecutorial 
response to discovery. If a violation of this duty is 
found, the trial court may fashion a remedy under rule 
16(g) . 
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv Rep. 23 (Utah 1994), quoting State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). In Knight, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction where the prosecution failed to 
properly disclose witnesses who were later used at trial. 
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The trial court recognized that the reference to the 
transcript and tape were prejudicial to the defendant. He also 
indicated that they were close to a mistrial. He did not, 
however, grant the motion for a mistrial. (Tr. at 153). The 
trial court did not order the objectionable material stricken. 
Where a trial court does not take appropriate measures under Rule 
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a reversal may be 
warranted. 
...if the trial judge denies the relief requested under Rule 
16 (g), that denial may constitute an abuse of discretion 
warranting a reversal. An abuse of discretion occurs when, 
taking into account any remedial measures ordered by the 
trial court, the prejudice to the defendant still satisfies 
the standard for reversible error set forth in Rule 30, and 
the remedial measures requested but refused would have 
obviated this prejudice. 
Knight at 918. 
Rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
reversal where there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant." State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 
635, 637 (Utah 1982). The next analysis, therefore, is to 
determine whether a more favorable result would have occurred 
without the reference to the tape and transcript. 
Because the tape and transcript were mentioned and not 
struck, the jury was left to speculate on their content. This is 
particularly harmful because in reality, the officer apparently 
did not hear a drug transaction on the tape. At the preliminary 
hearing this officer was asked whether he heard any of the 
conversation. He indicated that he had some problems because he 
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had to move. He was asked whether what he heard sounded like a 
drug purchase. This answer was "I don't believe so as I recall 
no." (Tr. at 151). 
In further determining whether the mention of the tape and 
transcript constituted harmful error, the weaknesses of the 
state's case must be considered. The State primarily relied on a 
single witness to make the elements of this charge. To avoid 
repetition, the problems regarding the testimony of this witness 
are set forth below. 
VI. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS IN THIS TRIAL 
WERE PREJUDICIAL AND A DIFFERENT RESULT WAS LIKELY ABSENT 
THE ERRORS. 
There were four separate instances of error in the conduct 
of the trial in the case at bar. There were four separate 
motions for a mistrial. Arguably each of the instances warranted 
the granting of the motion for a mistrial, as each error could 
have prejudiced the jury sufficiently that confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. Assuming, arguendo, that the separate 
errors, individually, are not sufficient to warrant a mistrial, 
they certainly warrant reversal and remand for a new trial when 
their cumulative effect is considered. 
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether any of 
the irregularities herein discussed would separately have 
been such as to constitute prejudicial error and require a 
new trial. It is recognized that a combination of errors 
which, when singly considered might be thought insufficient 
to warrant a reversal, might in their cumulative effect do 
so. 
State v. St. Claire, 282 P.2d 323, 332 (Utah 1955). 
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When analyzing multiple errors which have occurred in a 
trial, what the court is looking at is whether the cumulative 
errors undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In determining whether 
confidence in the verdict may be undermined, what is generally 
examined is the overall strength of the case put forward by the 
prosecution. If the case is extremely strong, the verdict can be 
sustained despite multiple errors. If a case is flawed, 
multiple errors can require reversal. In reversing a conviction 
after discovering multiple errors the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Alone, this error may have been harmless. However, viewed 
in conjunction with the prosecutor's improper argument, the 
fact that the evidence in favor of guilt was not strong, and 
the fact that these errors impacted Emmett's credibility and 
character, which were at the heart of his defense -- there 
is a reasonable likelihood that absent the errors a 
different result would have occurred. We therefore decline 
to accept the reasoning of the trial court that it was led 
into error by defense counsel's choice of trial strategy or 
that the error was simply harmless. Rather, we conclude 
that the error was of sufficient magnitude to warrant a new 
trial. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992). 
To determine whether the errors which occurred in the case 
at bar were harmful, it is critical to look at the weaknesses in 
the State's case. Basically the entire case is based on the 
testimony of Melva Palmasano, who was a less than reliable 
witness. 
Examination of the record makes it clear that Mrs. Palmasano 
was less than reliable. Ms. Palmasano was the instigator of the 
transaction with defendant, and had asked the defendant to supply 
her with some methamphetamine. (Tr. at 195) . Ms. Palmasano was 
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facing a 3rd degree felony for distribution of a controlled 
substance at the time this incident occurred. (Tr. at 195, 196). 
She may have therefore viewed the defendant as a competitor. The 
money to purchase the marijuana was not supplied by the police. 
(Tr. at 209). Palmasano testified that she received $5.00 
reimbursement for tapes. In reality she received $50.00. (Tr. 
at 212, 111, 112). She was eventually paid a total of $2500.00 
for her role in this transaction. (Tr. at 214). Her charges 
were dismissed as a result of her participation in this incident. 
She admitted having had marijuana in her home, and that she was a 
marijuana user. (Tr. at 217, 218). She admitted that she 
initiated the transaction with the defendant herself. (Tr. at 
219). She admitted under oath that on another occasion she lied 
to the very officers who were involved in this case. (Tr. at 
223, 244). The officer monitoring the transaction did not hear 
what sounded like a drug transaction. (Tr. at 151). There was 
no prior search of the confidential informant or her premises 
prior to the transaction. (Tr. at 167) . 
When considering these facts, without the added prejudice to 
the defendant of the errors, it is very likely that the jury 
could have reached a different conclusion about the evidence. If 
the jury chose not to believe Melva Palmisano it could have 
inferred that: 
1. Melva Palmasano was a drug user and dealer who had been 
arrested. 
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2. That she and her husband were facing serious felony-
charges . 
3. That she believed that if she could implicate someone 
else the charges against her could be reduced or dropped. 
4. That the defendant was chosen because she was viewed as a 
competitor, and was Palmasano's supervisor at work. 
5. That Palmasano lied about setting up a transaction with 
defendant. 
6. That the sale of drugs was faked. (remember that the 
officer did not hear a transaction. (Tr. at 151.) 
7. That Palmasano supplied her own marijuana to the officers 
and claimed that it came from defendant. 
8. That Palmasano lied to the officers here as she had on 
another occasion. 
9. That Palmasano was paid $2500.00 for her cooperation and 
testimony. 
The above requested inferences are all supported by the 
evidence from the trial. Proof of the elements of the crime 
charged are almost entirely based on the testimony of Melva 
Palmasano. Without the errors, the jury might well have 
concluded that Palmasano was lying and that the defendant should 
have been acquitted. 
The combination of the numerous errors along with the 
weakness of the states case makes this matter similar to State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). In Palmer, aggravated 
sexual abuse charges were reversed because numerous errors 
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combined with a weak case by the state served to undermine the 
confidence of the court in the verdict. In Palmer this court 
stated: 
While any one of these errors would in itself be harmless, 
their cumulative effect is not. The testimony in the case 
basically consisted of E.N.'s assertions and descriptions of 
sexual encounters and defendant's denial of those 
encounters. This case turned primarily on the jury's 
assessment of the credibility of E.N. versus the credibility 
of the defendant. Because of the nature of the evidence of 
guilt and the number of serious errors, we find the errors 
cumulatively harmful and cannot say we have confidence in 
the verdict. 
Palmer, at 350. 
Because of the numerous errors in the case at bar, the court 
cannot be confident in the verdict of the jury. For this reason, 
defendant respectfully requests that the matter be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Four separate instances of error occurred in this trial 
demanding a mistrial be declared. Each instance taken alone was 
sufficient for declaring a mistrial based on the prejudicial 
effects of the statement to the defendant. Certainly, all of the 
instances taken together sufficiently prejudiced the defendant's 
opportunity to a fair and impartial trial on the merits. 
The effect of the improper statements was to sufficiently 
taint the jury. Each of the instances gave the jury information 
which was prejudicial to defendant, and which tended to persuade 
the jury to convict the defendant on the "bad apple" theory, or, 
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in other words, convicting the defendant for bad character rather 
than basing the conviction on the evidence. 
The prosecutor's reference to a pending charge against 
defendant in his opening statement was not needed to establish 
foundation, as the prosecutor argued. The alleged trip to 
California to buy drugs was the subject of a separate action then 
pending in another division of the Fourth District Court. It 
occurred after the alleged sale of marijuana in this case. The 
remarks sufficiently inflamed the jury and prejudiced the 
defendant that defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was 
denied. 
The police officer's remark that the defendant was selling 
marijuana to minors, a crime of which the defendant has never 
been accused, further inflamed the jury and prejudiced the 
defendant. It implied that the defendant was implicated in other 
crimes, which were not proven. Furthermore, it could have no 
other effect than to demean the defendant and impress upon the 
jury that he had a propensity for crime. The defense moved for a 
mistrial which, again, was denied. 
The testimony from an officer that a transcript of a tape 
between the informant and the defendant existed also prejudiced 
the defendant. The prosecution voluntarily responded to 
discovery requests, however, they failed to give copies of the 
transcript to defendant until just prior to the lunch break. 
This mislead the defense in its preparation for trial on the 
basis that the prosecutor had indicated prior to trial that he 
26 
would not use tapes or transcripts; and this mislead the jury as 
to the contents of the tape, which, in fact, were void, according 
to the police officer, of any conversation regarding a drug 
transaction. 
Finally, the testimony from the confidential informant that 
defendant and her husband had been arrested for selling drugs 
previously, and that they were continuing to sell was prejudicial 
in two ways. First, it indicated that defendant and her husband 
were arrested for selling drugs previously; when, in fact, 
defendant had never been previously arrested on drug charges. 
Second, the statement indicated that the defendant was continuing 
to sell drugs after an arrest; when, in fact, defendant had never 
been arrested for or accused of selling drugs previous to this 
case. 
The errors are particularly harmful in this case where usual 
procedures were not followed in setting up this alleged drug 
transaction. The confidential informant and her husband were not 
searched. The premises were not searched. Money was not given 
by the police to the confidential informants with which to 
purchase the contraband. The confidential informant was facing 
charges at the time. The confidential informant admitted having 
lied to the same police officers on another occasion. The 
confidential informant was eventually paid for her testimony. 
The test is whether the jurors were likely to have been 
influenced by the improper remarks of counsel. Analyzing the 
strength of prosecution's case, it is apparent that the crux of 
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their case was the testimony of a less than reliable confidential 
informant who was paid for her testimony in both money and 
dismissal of pending charges. The defense strategy at trial was 
to damage the credibility of the confidential informant and make 
the jury believe that she may have fabricated the story. The 
confidential informant's credibility was damaged, and without the 
additional damage which came from the improper evidence and 
statement, defendant may not have been convicted. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the matter be reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this ffWi. day of March, 1995. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
BY 
DONALD E. MCENDLESS 
J . GRANT MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-
sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Fedeial Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing test. 
Bias. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence. 
Determination of admissibility. 
Expert testimony. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Harmless error. 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Offensive remarks. 
Other offenses. 
Photographic evidence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Impeachment. 
Psychiatric history and drug abuse. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Tape recordings. 
—Defendant's admissions. 
—Videotapes in pornography trial. 
Unfairly prejudicial. 
Victim's testimony. 
Cited. 
Balancing test. 
The balancing test of this rule excludes mat-
ter of scant or cumulative probative force, 
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prej-
udicial effect. State v. Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal 
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927. 
Admissibility of DNA identification evi-
dence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313. 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Bias. 
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is 
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, 
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness 
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced 
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the 
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue 
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative 
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Credibility of witness. 
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his assessment of the credi-
bility of testimony for that of the jury by ex-
cluding testimony simply because he does not 
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S. 
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988). 
Cumulative evidence. 
While there may have been little reason to 
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded 
conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant because the evidence 
was cumulative, their admission was not preju-
dicial because the transcripts merely repeated 
the informant's in-court testimony. State v. 
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985). 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL, KEJEKEINUJKS 
Utah Law Review. — Chapman v. State: 
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony — An Issue 
of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983 Utah L. 
Rev. 381. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L. Rev. 839. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1987 Utah L. 
Rev. 137. 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child 
Abuse Litigation, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 479. 
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting 
"Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt 
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v. Bishop, 
1989 Utah L Rev. 1013. 
State v. Rimmasch: Utah's Threshold Admis-
sibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Pro-
file Evidence, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 641. 
Journa l of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81 
(1989). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 253 et seq. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this 
rule apply to character evidence to prove con-
duct, as distinguished from proof of character 
where character is an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was 
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the 
character of the victim of a homicide was ad-
missible to rebut the defendant's contention 
that the deceased was the aggressor). One sig-
nificant difference between this rule and Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there 
i C J . S . — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 166. 
A.L.R. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil 
i case, limiting number of, 5 AJL.R.3d 169. 
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case, 
c limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 238. 
1
 Character or reputation witnesses, propriety 
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting 
" number of, 17 A.L.R.3d 327. 
'• Admissibility of polygraph or similar lie de-
tector test results, or willingness to submit to 
test, on issues of coverage under insurance pol-
icy, or insurer's good-faith belief that claim 
I was not covered, 7 A.L.R.5th 143. 
Sufficiency of evidence that witness in crimi-
' nal case was hypnotized, for purposes of deter-
mining admissibility of testimony given under 
hypnosis or of hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony, 16 A.L.R.5th 841. 
Evidence offered by defendant at federal 
> criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403 
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that 
L probative value is substantially outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, 
> or misleading the jury, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 700. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence *=> 143. 
is no provision for the use of character evidence 
in civil cases, except where character is the 
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 
authorized the use of character evidence in 
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but 
where otherwise substantively relevant. See 
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive 
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However, 
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) ex-
pressly excluded character evidence with re-
spect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
concluded that the remaining justification for 
the admission of character evidence was so in-
significant that character evidence in civil 
cases should not be admitted unless it was in 
issue. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. For-
syth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce, 
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977). 
ANALYSIS 
Application of rule. 
Character of accused. 
Character of codefendant. 
Common plan or scheme. 
Harmless error. 
Identity. 
Knowledge and intent. 
Limiting instruction. 
Other crimes. 
—Defense. 
Proof of motive. 
Severance. 
Specific instances of conduct. 
Victim's character. 
Cited. 
Application of rule. 
Admissibility of evidence of an act that con-
stitutes an early step in the effectuation of the 
crime for which defendant is presently charged 
and tried is not governed by this rule. State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
This rule allows prior bad act evidence in a 
criminal trial when it is offered to show any 
element of the alleged crime. Prior bad act evi-
dence is only excluded if the sole reason it is 
being offered is to prove bad character or to 
show that a person acted in conformity with 
that character. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993). 
Character of accused. 
When it becomes apparent from the evidence 
that the defendant is relying upon the defense 
of entrapment, the State must be allowed to 
present any evidence in impeachment or rebut-
tal that would show the defendant's disposition 
to commit the crime charged, including prior 
acts of crime or misconduct. State v. Hansen, 
588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978). 
By offering witnesses as to his reputation as 
a truthful person, defendant opens the door for 
the prosecution to impeach his character wit-
nesses; prosecution may attempt to discredit 
the testimony of such witnesses by showing 
that they have not heard specific reports that 
are relevant to defendant's reputation, but it 
cannot present evidence of the truth or falsity 
of specific beliefs or reports pertaining to that 
reputation. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 
1981). 
While evidence of defendant's criminal char-
acter may be, and generally is, excluded under 
Subdivision (b) of this rule when such evidence 
is elicited or offered by the prosecution to prove 
its case-in-chief, the same evidence may be ad-
missible when the responsibility for its intro-
duction may be traced to the defendant. State 
v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984). 
Since a defendant's character is not an ele-
ment of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
a defendant charged with such crime for ad-
mission of past instances of conduct relating to 
his "reputation for sexual morality." State v. 
Mixler, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985). 
Character of codefendant. 
Proffered testimony as to codefendant's im-
pulsiveness had no bearing on defendant's 
guilt or innocence and was not admissible. 
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). 
Common plan or scheme. 
In prosecution for violation of § 76-6-404, 
where it was alleged that defendant had, with-
out authorization, taken a check payable to his 
employer which came into his possession in the 
course of his employment, endorsed it in the 
employer's name, and deposited it to an ac-
count he controlled, and the defense was based 
on a claim of right, it was proper to permit 
introduction of evidence of defendant's conver-
sion of other funds belonging to his employer, 
since such testimony could establish a common 
plan or scheme and show a motive for the of-
fense at issue, upon which the jury could base 
an assessment of the veracity of defendant's 
testimony. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 
1977). 
Evidence of a prior scheme involving selling 
fruit vending machines and keeping the pur-
chase money without any intent to deliver the 
machines to the purchasers was admissible to 
establish defendant's intent and modus 
operandi in present charge of theft by decep-
tion involving a similar scheme to sell fruit 
vending machines without any intent to de-
liver such machines. State v. Kerekes, 622 
P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Evidence is not admitted merely because it 
shows a common plan, scheme, or manner of 
operation. Instead, evidence of a common plan, 
scheme, or manner of operation is admitted 
where it tends to prove some fact material to 
the crime charged. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 
1172 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence of defendant's possession of mari-
juana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to 
the offense charged, was properly admitted, 
where the contested evidence was particularly 
probative on the issue of constructive posses-
sion and was illustrative of defendant's com-
mon plan of marijuana distribution. State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Harmless error. 
Hearsay statements and other evidence re-
lating to defendant's prior illegal activity, 
while inadmissible under the rules of evidence, 
was not necessarily harmful error, because it 
was conceivable that defense counsel made a 
deliberate and wise tactical choice in not focus-
ing jury attention on them by objecting. State 
v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988). 
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